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Abstract 
The paper discusses the determinants of productivity growth in manufacturing 
foreign  subsidiaries  in  Slovenia.  Special  attention  is  given  to  the  impact  of 
                                                 
1 Corresponding author: matija.rojec@gov.si. control  pattern.  We  show  that  productivity  growth  is  significantly  and 
positively  correlated  with  the  level  of  foreign  parent  companies'  control  of 
marketing and strategic business functions. Larger subsidiaries and subsidiaries 
with  higher  exports  to  sales  ratio  also  experience  higher  changes  in  the 
productivity  level.  Subsidiaries  in  high  technology  intensity  sectors  exhibit 
significantly lower change in productivity than subsidiaries in other sectors.  
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Introduction 
The narrowing down of the productivity gap faced by new EU member states 
will be of major importance for their successful integration in the EU, i.e. for 
the real convergence of their economies. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has 
traditionally been treated as an important means of increasing the productivity 
of transition economies. The impact of FDI is mainly direct, i.e. through higher 
productivity of foreign subsidiaries, be they greenfields or acquisitions, rather 
than through growth of productivity in indigenous enterprises (Hunya 2000, 
Holland et al 2000, Jindra 2006, Dimelis and Louri 2002). Indirect effects of 
FDI as identified by econometric research suggest that horizontal spillovers are 
either  absent  or  negative  (Damijan  et  al  2003,  Konings  2001, Jensen  2002, 
Gorg and Greenaway 2002). Vertical spillovers seem to be present (Damijan et 
al 2003, Smarzynska-Javorcik 2004) although wider evidence is needed.  
In  this  paper  we  are  interested  in  the  processes  of  productivity  growth  and 
upgrading  in  the  manufacturing  foreign  subsidiaries  in  Slovenia,  how  the 
changes happen and what are the determinants behind them. Specifically, we 
try to find answers to: What factors determine productivity growth in foreign 
subsidiaries? What types of subsidiaries in terms of competencies are present in 
Slovenia? What is the strategic, marketing and operational control of foreign 
parent  companies?  How  do  competency  and  control  issues  affect  the 
productivity growth of subsidiaries? In conceptual terms, we approach the issue 
of productivity growth in FDI subsidiaries by building on the ‘developmental 
subsidiaries’ perspective (Birkinshaw and Hood 1998, Birkinshaw et al 1998, 
Birkinshaw 2001). In addition, our empirical research should contribute to the 
emerging  literature  that  bridges  the  gap  between  international  business  and 
growth theories (Ozawa and Castello 2001). Majcen B., Rojec M., Jaklič A., and Radošević S., Productivity Growth and Functional 
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This paper reports on results of research based on a questionnaire survey of 72 
subsidiaries  in  the  Slovenian  manufacturing  sector.  Section  2  of  the  paper 
outlines the conceptual approach of the analysis. Section 3 explains the sample 
and  its  features.  Section  4  reports  on  the  results  of  the  research  based  on 
descriptive analysis. Section 5 describes the model, explores the determinants 
of productivity growth in foreign subsidiaries and interprets the  results. Section 
6 concludes. 
Conceptual Approach 
Conceptually, the paper is based on the literature that is focused on FDI and 
growth,  developmental  subsidiaries  and  on  linkages  between  international 
business and endogenous growth theories. The literature on FDI and growth 
analyses this link through analysis of the costs and benefits of FDI, through 
estimates of spillovers and, at micro level, through linkages between growth 
and types of FDI (see Navaretti and Venables 2004 for a review). Beyond the 
initial  investment,  FDI  may  influence  growth  by  raising  total  factor 
productivity in the recipient economy. This works through the linkages between 
FDI and foreign trade flows, the spillovers, and the direct impact on structural 
factors  in  the  host  economy.  Most  empirical  studies  conclude  that  FDI 
generally makes a positive contribution ‘to both factor productivity and income 
growth in host countries, beyond  what domestic investment normally would 
trigger’  (OECD  2002,  p.  13).  It  is,  however,  more  difficult  to  assess  the 
magnitude of this impact. Here, three issues attracted special attention. The first 
is the relation between foreign and domestic investment. The extent to which 
FDI  enhances  growth  depends  on  the  degree  of  complementarity  and 
substitution between FDI and domestic investment (De Mello 1996). Cases of 
crowding out of domestic investment by FDI have been reported. The second is 
the  importance  of  host  country  absorption  capacity.  FDI  impact  on  growth 
varies  considerably  between  developed  and  developing  countries  (De  Mello 
1997), although the beneficial effect of FDI is stronger in countries with an 
outward  oriented  trade  policy  than  in  those  with  an  inward  oriented  policy 
(Balasubramanyam et al 1996). The third issue is that the ultimate impact of 
FDI on growth in the recipient economy depends on the scope for technological 
upgrading and  knowledge/efficiency spillovers to domestic firms (De Mello 
1997, Barrell and Pain 1997). 
The main conclusions of this stream of literature as far as transition countries is 
concerned are that foreign subsidiaries are deepening trade linkages; that direct 
effects  of  FDI  are  the  significantly  higher  productivity  of  acquired 
companies/greenfields  than  that  of  domestic  firms;  and  that  the  extent  of 
spillovers from FDI is still very limited, non-existent or even negative (Holland et  al  2000,  Hunya  2000,  Resmini  2000,  Rojec  2000,  Konings  2001,  Meyer 
1998, Damijan et al 2003). In short, ‘FDI inflows have improved the overall 
growth potential of the recipient economies, but primarily through productivity 
improvements  within  the  foreign  affiliates  themselves,  rather  than  through 
increased  capital  investment,  or  technology  spillovers  to  domestic  firms’ 
(Holland et al 2000).  
The  above  literature,  however,  does  not  deal  with  the  process  by  which 
productivity is generated, i.e. the mechanisms by which subsidiaries grow and 
integrate  into  parent  companies’  networks,  the  latter  being  of  our  specific 
interest to us. To tackle this issue, the international business literature offers 
more solid grounds. The literature on subsidiary development is focused on the 
process through which multinational companies’ (MNCs) subsidiaries enhance 
their resources and capabilities, and in so doing add increasing level of value to 
the  MNC  as  a  whole  (for  a  review  and  conceptual  analysis  of  subsidiary 
evolution see Birkinshaw and Hood 1998). The literature on subsidiary strategy 
(White and Poynter 1984, Bartlett and Ghoshal 1986, 1989, Young et al 1988, 
Birkinshaw and Hood 1998, Andersson and Forsgren 2000) has advanced our 
understanding of how MNCs operate. Heterogeneity in the role of subsidiaries 
has led to a view of MNCs as a ‘differentiated network of subsidiaries’ (Bartlett 
and Ghoshal 1989) which operate as ‘quasi firms’ (Tavares 1999) while the 
multinational enterprise (MNE) itself can be treated as an ‘interorganisational 
network’ (Roth and Morrison 1992). 
This paper builds on the literature on subsidiary development by introducing 
the notion of subsidiary upgrading and linking it to productivity issues. Our 
focus is on productivity growth and its determinants in foreign subsidiaries, 
from the host country perspective. The host country perspective focuses on the 
micro basis of growth and hence could be defined as Porterian (Porter et al 
2002). The approach that comes closest to our perspective is that of Young et al 
(1988) and ‘developmental subsidiaries’ in a regional development context. We 
focus on subsidiary autonomy and resource development (Penrose 1959). As 
the  literature  on  subsidiary  development  suggests  ‘the  subsidiary  is  a 
semiautonomous entity capable of making its own decisions but constrained in 
its action by the demand of head office managers and by the opportunities in 
the local environment’ (Birkinshaw and Hood 1998, p. 780). This brings to the 
fore issues such as subsidiary’s competencies and autonomy (or, vice versa, of 
a foreign parent company’s control) as productivity growth factors. Types of 
competencies will affect the scope of productivity improvements. Subsidiaries 
that are strong in R&D and operate in growing high tech sectors are likely to 
record higher productivity rates than those that operate in low-tech areas and 
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autonomy of subsidiary may also affect the scope for productivity growth. In 
subsidiaries  that  are  tightly  controlled  in  all  their  functions  and  are  very 
dependent on the parent, local managers will not have the freedom to exploit 
the opportunities for productivity growth. Autonomous subsidiaries are more 
likely to be centres of excellence and highly productive enterprises. 
Increases in productivity at subsidiary level have their equivalent in different 
forms  of  upgrading.  Our  conceptual  approach,  derived  from  the  above 
theoretical considerations, is based on three forms of upgrading the position of 
subsidiaries and on several dimensions of integration of subsidiary into MNC 
network. A Subsidiary can upgrade its position through: (i) functional extension 
(sales,  manufacturing,  finance),  i.e.  by  adding  new  mandates  or  functions 
and/or (ii) expansion of lines of business (for example, colour TV and audio-
visual equipment), (iii) value added expansion by extending the scale of the 
existing mandate through sales and exports or new lines of business. Upgrading 
a subsidiary occurs through several dimensions, i.e. product flows, knowledge 
flows and capital flows. Mechanisms of subsidiary upgrading and productivity 
growth  are  the  introduction  of  new  functions  and  new  lines  of  businesses 
(expansion  of  scope)  as  well  as  the  expansion  of  the  existing  functions 
(expansion of scale). Figure 1 illustrates this conceptual approach. 
 
Figure 1: Mechanisms of Productivity Growth via Subsidiary Upgrading: A 
Conceptual Model 
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In continuation, we discuss the relevance of the above concept for productivity 
growth in foreign subsidiaries and propose several hypotheses. First, following 
Szalavetz  (2000)  we  distinguish  between  static  and  dynamic  modernisation effects  of  FDI.  A  Static  modernisation  effect  is  expansion  within  basically 
unchanged mandate and is reflected in subsidiaries autonomy over operational 
functions. Dynamic effects are present when subsidiary expands the range of 
functions under its control (functional upgrading).  
Second, differences between subsidiaries in their autonomy reflect differences 
in the tasks designated to them by parent companies. Subsidiaries differ in the 
extent to which they are only production units and in the extent to which they 
are business organisations. The more subsidiaries have to be specialised within 
the MNC network the narrower will be the range of business functions they 
control. Equally, the range of inherited capabilities could determine the degree 
of functional control. 
Third, increased autonomy of a subsidiary in the corporate function portfolio 
develops  from  operational  to  more  strategic  autonomy,  which  shows  the 
dynamic effect of industrial integration. In this context, product development 
and marketing are two functions with a distinctive strategic element. Szalavetz 
(2000), points that ‘the quality of the transferred technology depends not only 
on the recipient’s absorption capabilities but also (or maybe even more so) on 
its  marketing  capabilities’.  However,  this  probably  greatly  depends  on  the 
market orientation of the subsidiary. For exporters, a shift from production only 
to subsidiary with autonomous control of marketing functions is very difficult. 
For a local market seeking FDI marketing function is essential part of mandate. 
Here the situation for transition countries subsidiaries is probably similar to 
partial  participation  or  production  only  participation  of  local  firms  from 
emerging markets in the transnational value chains (Craig and Douglas 1997). 
Marketing  capabilities  are  linkage  capabilities  and  thus  may  be  crucial  for 
breaking dependence on parent company. 
Fourth, responsibility for strategic functions, especially product development 
and strategic management, are much more difficult to acquire. Autonomy in 
this area denotes quite autonomous subsidiaries, which can potentially operate 
as centres of excellence within MNC network. 
In the context of the above conceptual approach, on the empirical level our 
main objective is to establish the productivity growth in foreign subsidiaries in 
the Slovenian manufacturing and to explore, the factors responsible for that 
productivity  growth.  To  do  that,  we  analyse  the  magnitude  of  productivity 
growth and other changes, the relationships of sample subsidiaries with their 
headquarters  and  the  competence  profile  of  subsidiaries.  Specifically,  we 
analyse the following parameters, which define the position and upgrading of 
the position of subsidiaries in foreign parent companies networks and which 
represent  potential  determinants  of  productivity  growth:  (i)  selected  firm Majcen B., Rojec M., Jaklič A., and Radošević S., Productivity Growth and Functional 
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specific variables of foreign subsidiaries (foreign equity share, company size, 
technology intensity of the industry in which a subsidiary is engaged), (ii) the 
division of control between subsidiaries and their foreign parent companies in 
various business functions, (iii) the structure of sales of subsidiaries, (iv) the 
main areas of competitiveness of foreign subsidiaries. All in all, our interest is 
specifically focused on the issue of the link between productivity growth and 
the division of control (autonomy) between a foreign parent company and its 
Slovenian subsidiary.  
Methodology and Sample 
The above conceptual framework has been tested using a 2 page ‘Questionnaire 
for  foreign  investment  enterprises’.
2  The  questionnaire  was  sent  to  209 
manufacturing  FIEs,  representing  69.2%  of  all  FIEs  in  the  Slovenian 
manufacturing  sector.
3  72  questionnaires  were  returned  which  gives  34.4% 
response rate. In value terms the response rate is much higher; in terms of fixed 
assets it was 56.9%, in terms of sales 64.4%, in terms of exports 66.8% and in 
terms  of  employment  52.2%.  Response  rate  in  high  and  medium-high 
technology  industries  is  higher  than  in  medium-low  and  low  technology 
industries.  In  general,  the  sample  questionnaire  exhibits  a  high  level  of 
representativeness,  although  it  is  to  some  extent  biased  towards  larger  and 
technology more intensive FIEs. The main characteristics of the sample are: 
 
·  FIEs which answered the questionnaire, i.e. sample FIEs, represent 23.8% 
of all FIEs in the Slovenian manufacturing (population) and are responsible 
for 50.8% of their employment, 53.6% of fixed assets, 62.1% of sales and 
64.2% of exports.
4 Sectoral distributions of sample FIEs also fits well to the 
sectoral distribution of all manufacturing FIEs. 
·  Sample FIEs include all sizes of firms (measured by number of employees) 
among which small and mediums sized FIEs prevail, i.e. 47.2% of them 
have between 51 and 500 employees, and 38.9% less than 51 employees. 
·  Most of the sample firms, i.e. 56.9% were registered as FIEs in the 1994-
1998 period. Only in 15.3% of cases is the registration dated before 1990.  
·  The vast majority of sample FIEs are majority owned by strategic foreign 
investors. In 41.7% of cases FIEs are 100% foreign owned, while in 37.5% 
of cases foreign investors hold 51%-99% of equity. 
                                                 
2 See questionnaire on http://www.iwh-halle.de/projects/productivity-gap/. 
3 They represent more than 95% of total manufacturing FIEs population in terms of fixed assets, 
sales, exports and employment. 
4 Sample FIEs are also a very relevant part of the overall Slovenian manufacturing sector; they 
holds 11.7% of its fixed assets, 8.4% of employment, 6.3% of sales and 21.7% of exports. ·  Intermediate goods are much more frequent products of sample FIEs than 
final products. Intermediate products are produced by as much as 76.4% of 
the  sample  firms,  while  final  products  are  produced  in  50.0%  of  cases. 
26.4%  of  firms  produce  intermediate  as  well  as  final  products.  Such  a 
pattern  is  linked  to  the  predominantly  factor  cost  advantages-seeking 
motivation of manufacturing foreign investors in Slovenia. 
Productivity  Growth  of  Sample  FIEs  and  their  Operational 
Characteristics – Descriptive Analysis 
In  the  descriptive  analysis  we  explore  those  operational  characteristics  of 
sample subsidiaries, which will be subsequently used as variables in our model. 
They  relate  to  the  magnitude  of  changes,  to  the  relationships  of  sample 
subsidiaries with their headquarters and local and foreign environment, and to 
the competence profile of subsidiaries. 
Changes and upgrading of activities in sample FIEs after the engagement of 
strategic foreign investors 
Changes and upgrading of activities in sample FIEs after the engagement of 
strategic foreign investors are in the focus of our interest. It is the changes and 
upgrading of activities in a company after the entrance of a strategic foreign 
investor, which brings the improvements in productivity of the invested-in firm 
and  possibly  a  reduction  in  the  productivity  gap  between  the  host  and  the 
investing country.  
In the questionnaire, the changes were classified into five areas: changes in value of 
sales, changes in exports, changes in productivity levels, changes in technology levels 
and changes in quality levels. Table 1 suggests that foreign investors in general brought 
about positive changes in the companies. On average their engagement has resulted in 
change  meaning  slightly  more  than  ‘increase’  (0,55;  see  note  to  Table  1  for  the 
definition of  the  indicator).  The  magnitude  of  changes  in  all  the  areas  has  been  on 
average pretty much the same. The latter is confirmed by Spearman's coefficients of 
rank correlation between the magnitude of changes in individual areas; the coefficients 
are positive and significant. This demonstrates not only that changes in one area are 
positively  correlated  with  changes  in  other  areas  but  also  that,  when  changes  are 
introduced this does not happen only in one or two areas but on a broad scale of a 
company's  operations  and  with  similar  intensity.  The  highest  correlation  is  between 
changes in productivity and quality (0.710), and productivity and technology (0.692). It 
is obvious that changes in productivity go along with changes in technology and quality.   
Table 1: Magnitude of changes of individual areas since sample FIEs were registered as a foreign investment 
enterprise 
 
Magnitude of change  Value of 
sales 
Share of 
exports 
Level of 
productivity 
Level of 
technology 
Level of 
quality 
OVER- 
ALL 
SAMPLE FIEs DISTRIBUTION BY MAGNITUDE OF CHANGE   
Considerable reduction  1.4  1.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  n.a. 
Reduction  2.8  2.8  0.0  1.4  0.0  n.a. 
No change  13.9  22.2  19.4  22.2  29.2  n.a. 
Increase  38.9  27.8  43.1  44.4  44.4  n.a. 
Considerable increase  43.1  45.8  36.1  30.6  23.6  n.a. 
No response  0.0  0.0  1.4  1.4  2.8  n.a. 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  n.a. 
INDICATOR OF MAGNITUDE OF CHANGE*   
Total  0.597  0.569  0.585  0.528  0.471  0.550 
High technology industries  0.583  0.500  0.333  0.417  0.333  0.433 
Medium-high technology industries  0.593  0.556  0.556  0.481  0.481  0.533 
Medium-low technology industries  0.643  0.625  0.630  0.519  0.481  0.580 
Low technology industries  0.500  0.500  0.682  0.727  0.500  0.582 
*  Calculated in a way that answers »considerable reduction« are weighted by -1.0, answers »reduction« by –0.5, answers »no 
change« 0, answers »increase« by 0.5 and answers »considerable increase« 1.0. The higher the indicator the more a particular 
business function is controlled by foreign parent companies. An interesting feature, which comes out from Table 1 is that the magnitude of 
changes seems to decrease with the increase of FIEs technological intensity, i.e. 
the lower the technology intensity the higher the magnitude of change. This 
pattern is the most obvious as far as the increase in the level of productivity and 
of technology is concerned. The increase in productivity/technology level is the 
lowest  in  high  technology  industries  and  the  highest  in  low  technology 
industries,  medium  technology  industries  being  in  between.  A  possible 
explanation  is  that  in  low  technology  FIEs,  there  was  more  scope  for  the 
increase of productivity/technology levels than in high technology FIEs, the 
latter  being  less  behind  their  competitors  than  the  former.  Still,  absolute 
differences  in  the  magnitude  of  changes  among  various  categories  of 
technological intensity are rather small. 
Relationships of sample FIEs with their headquarters and local and foreign 
environment 
The  relationships  of  the  sample  FIEs  with  their  headquarters  and  local  and 
foreign  environment  are  reflected  in  the  division  of  decision-making  and 
control  of  various  business  functions  between  a  subsidiary  and  its  foreign 
parent company, and in the structure of sales and supplies of FIEs. 
Pattern  of  decision-making  and  control  in  subsidiaries.  Table  2  presents  a 
pattern of decision-making and control in various areas of business operations 
in FIEs, according to who undertakes them, i.e. only FIE, mainly FIE, only 
foreign parent or mainly foreign parent. Based on our conceptual approach, we 
distinguish among thirteen business  functions,  which are grouped into three 
groups: operational, marketing and strategic. 
Increased autonomy of a subsidiary in the corporate function portfolio develops 
from operational to marketing and then to strategic autonomy. Therefore, we 
expect  that  foreign  parent  companies  exercise  lower  control  in  operational, 
followed by higher control in marketing and most of all in strategic functions. 
Since sample FIEs are on average highly export oriented (exports to sales ratio 
is 72.9%; see table 3) we may also expect foreign parent companies will want 
to retain a relatively higher level of control in the marketing functions. Table 2 
fully confirms our expectations. Somewhat surprising may be the fact that, on 
general, the vast majority of business functions are undertaken only or mainly 
by the sample FIEs themselves. There is not a single business function, which 
would be predominantly undertaken only or mainly by foreign parents. Foreign 
investors are eager to retain more control in two areas of strategic and long-
term importance, i.e. in product development and marketing, including market Majcen B., Rojec M., Jaklič A., and Radošević S., Productivity Growth and Functional 
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research. The fact that foreign parent companies want the highest control in the 
marketing functions could be explained by the high export propensity of FIEs. 
Spearman's  coefficients  of  rank  correlation  between  individual  business 
functions  according  to  who  undertakes  them  show  pretty  high  positive  and 
significant correlations, the only exception being ‘accounting and finance of 
operations’,  which  is  not  significantly  correlated  with  any  other  business 
function. Marketing functions are particularly highly correlated with each other. 
All in all, it seems that individual foreign investors do have their own patterns 
of control, some preferring tighter control than the others. If they are keen to 
exercise tighter control they do that in most business functions, and vice versa, 
if  they  exercise  lower  level  of  control  this  is  the  case  in  most  business 
functions. 
A  comparison  of  decision-making  and  control  pattern  in  FIEs  in  terms  of 
technology intensity of industries gives a mixed picture. Indicators of foreign 
parents' influence on decision making (see note to Table 2) shows the highest 
foreign  control  in  high  technology  industries  followed  by  low  technology 
industries, and somewhat lower level of control in medium-high and medium-
low  technology  industries.  It  is  normally  expectated  is  that  foreign  parent 
would  reduce  its  influence  on  decision  making  in  FIEs  by  decreasing 
technology levels of an industry, but high indicator of foreign parents' control 
in low technology industries does not support this view. Obviously there are 
other more important factors, which determine the influence of foreign parents 
on decision-making in FIEs. What is especially interesting in this context is that 
FIEs in high as well as in medium-high technology industries exhibit lower 
than average levels of foreign parents' influence on product development and 
on  strategic  management  and  planning,  which  are  rather  important  business 
functions for technological development. Low technology FIEs exhibit much 
above average foreign parents' influence in these two business functions. For 
strategic functions in general, foreign parents' control is the highest in the case 
of low technology FIEs (see Table 2). 
 
 
  
 
Table 2: Who undertakes individual business functions in sample FIEs? 
 
Indicator of foreign parent company influence*  Business functions  Only/mainly 
FIE (%) 
Only/mainly 
foreign parent 
company (%) 
Not 
defined 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Average  High 
tech ind. 
Medium-high 
tech ind 
Medium-low. 
tech ind. 
Low 
tech ind. 
Operational management  97.2  2.8  0.0  100.0  0.111  0.222  0.123  0.071  0.121 
Process engineering  83.3  16.7  0.0  100.0  0.278  0.389  0.284  0.238  0.303 
Supply and logistics  90.3  9.7  0.0  100.0  0.194  0.278  0.173  0.167  0.273 
Accounting and finance  94.4  5.6  0.0  100.0  0.083  0.167  0.099  0.036  0.121 
Operational functions  91.3  8.7  0.0  100.0  0.167  0.264  0.170  0.128  0.205 
Distribution, sales  69.4  30.6  0.0  100.0  0.319  0.500  0.333  0.238  0.394 
Advertisement  65.3  29.2  5.6  100.0  0.333  0.556  0.333  0.267  0.364 
After sale services  69.4  27.8  2.8  100.0  0.305  0.444  0.358  0.222  0.300 
Marketing  59.7  40.3  0.0  100.0  0.403  0.500  0.370  0.381  0.485 
Market research  52.8  47.2  0.0  100.0  0.463  0.444  0.444  0.440  0.576 
Marketing functions  63.3  35.0  1.7  100.0  0.365  0.489  0.368  0.310  0.424 
Determining the product price  70.9  29.1  0.0  100.0  0.315  0.500  0.272  0.226  0.545 
Investment finance  79.2  20.8  0.0  100.0  0.269  0.333  0.259  0.238  0.333 
Product development  54.2  45.8  0.0  100.0  0.454  0.444  0.444  0.405  0.606 
Strategic management and planning  68.1  31.9  0.0  100.0  0.398  0.333  0.383  0.393  0.485 
Strategic functions  68.1  31.9  0.0  100.0  0.359  0.403  0.340  0.316  0.492 
OVERALL  73.4  26.0  0.6  100.0  0.302  0.393  0.298  0.256  0.377 
*  Alternatively, this can also be called the indicator of subsidiary’s autonomy. It is calculated in a way that answers »Only FIE« are 
weighted by 0.0, answers »Mainly FIE« are weighted by 0.33, answers »Mainly foreign parent company« are weighted by 0.66 
and answers »Only foreign parent company are weighted by 1.0. The higher the indicator the more a particular business function 
is controlled by foreign parent companies. The structure of sales and supplies is very important variable for understanding 
the autonomy of business functions as well as patterns of upgrading. It also 
indicates  FIEs  integration  in  foreign  parent  companies'  networks  and  FIEs' 
relationships  with  local  and  foreign  environment.  Most  of  the  sales  of  the 
sample  FIEs  goes  to  exports.  The  most  important  buyer  of  FIEs  are  their 
foreign parents. The highest export propensity as well as the highest share of 
sales going to foreign parents is in high technology industries (88.8% exports to 
sales ratio and 41.5% of sales going to foreign parents), followed by medium-
low  technology  industries  (77.8%  and  39.4%  respectively),  medium-high 
technology  industries  (67.7%  and  36.1%  respectively)  and  low  technology 
industries  (64.5%  and  31.5%  respectively).  This  confirms  the  predominant 
factor  cost  advantages-seeking  motivation  of  foreign  investors  in  Slovenian 
manufacturing (see Rojec et al 2000). Almost non-existing sales to other local 
subsidiaries of foreign owners indicates that foreign investors in Slovenia, as a 
rule, do not have more than one subsidiary. Only other Slovenian companies 
are relevant as local buyers (Table 3). 
The structure of supplies of FIEs is to a certain extent a mirror image of the 
sales structure. Most of supplies come from abroad, however, the major foreign 
suppliers  are  not  foreign  parents  but  other  foreign  suppliers.  Also,  other 
Slovenian companies have a much more important role as suppliers than as 
buyers; they are the major supplier category of FIEs. All in all, it seems that 
FIEs are more integrated into the foreign parent company's network via sales 
than via supplies, while, on the other hand, they are more integrated into the 
Slovenian  economy  via  supplies  than  via  sales.  The  latter  definitely  seems 
favourable from the host country development point of view (Table 3). 
There  are  considerable  differences  in  supplies'  pattern  of  FIEs  in  terms  of 
technology intensity of industries in which they are engaged. High technology 
FIEs get many more supplies from their foreign parents, the opposite situation 
being  the  case  in  low  technology  FIEs.  On  the  other  hand,  medium-low 
technology FIEs get many more of their supplies from other domestic suppliers. 
As  expected,  high  technology  FIEs  are  definitely  the  most  integrated  into 
parent  companies’  network,  on  the  sales  as  well  as  on  the  supplies  side. 
Technology – the issues of complexity and mastering of technology, on one 
side, and the wish to retain technological advantages and not to disclose them, 
on the other – is obviously is a very important reason for internalisation (Table 
3).Table 3: Structure of sales and supplies of sample FIEs; % 
 
Sales to   
SALES  Foreign 
parent 
company 
Other 
foreign 
buyers 
Other local 
subsidiaries of 
foreign parent 
Other 
local 
buyers 
Total  37.1  35.8  0.5  28.1 
High technology industries  41.5  47.3  0.0  11.2 
Medium-high technology industries  36.1  31.6  0.9  31.4 
Medium-low technology industries  39.4  38.4  0.4  28.9 
Low technology industries  31.5  33.0  0.0  27.3 
Supplies from   
SUPPLIES  Foreign 
parent 
company 
Other 
foreign 
suppliers 
Other local 
subsidiaries of 
foreign parent 
Other 
local 
suppliers 
Total  23.5  34.6  0.5  41.3 
High technology industries  33.8  32.2  0.0  34.0 
Medium-high technology industries  23.0  38.4  1.3  37.3 
Medium-low technology industries  23.5  29.2  0.0  46.9 
Low technology industries  18.8  40.2  0.0  41.0 
 Competence profile of sample FIEs and sources of their competitiveness 
Increasing  of  competitiveness  is  the  key  issue  related  to  reducing  of 
productivity gap. In this context we explore how important are individual areas 
of competitiveness for FIEs. Four possible areas of competitiveness were put 
forward by the questionnaire: quality, patents and licenses and R&D, people 
and training, and management. Table 4 shows that the most important area of 
competitiveness is quality, followed by management, people and training, and 
patents, licences and R&D. With the exception of patents, licences and R&D, 
the other three areas are on average assessed as 'very important' or even higher. 
The relatively low level of importance of patents, licences and R&D reinforces 
the view that Slovenian subsidiaries base their market position on developed 
production,  much  less  on  technology  capacities.  This  is  not  surprisingly, 
knowing that in most manufacturing FIEs in Slovenia a relatively standardised 
technology is in use and that relatively few FIEs are in the high technology 
industry  sectors.  This  is  important  because  patents,  licences  and  R&D,  and 
people and training are treated as much more important for the competitiveness 
of high technology FIEs than of medium-high or medium-low technology FIEs 
and even more so  for low technology FIEs (see Table 4). 
Spearman's  coefficients  of  rank  correlation  between  individual  areas  of 
competitiveness  shows  relatively  high  positive  and  significant  correlations. 
This  demonstrates  not  only  that  competitiveness  in  one  area  is  positively 
correlated with competitiveness in other areas, but also that competitiveness is 
a complex phenomenon composed of 'being good' in a number of areas. In 
other words, a company is competitive or not because of its overall business 
setting; for instance improvements and competitiveness in quality control spill 
over to management and training etc.   
 
 
Table 4: Importance of various areas for competitiveness of sample FIEs 
 
  Quality  Patents, 
licences, R&D 
People and 
training 
Management  Total 
SAMPLE FIEs DISTRIBUTION BY IMPORTANCE OF AREAS OF COMPETITIVENESS 
Not important  0.0  5.6  1.4  0.0  n.a. 
Less important  0.0  15.3  6.9  4.2  n.a. 
Important  12.5  40.3  19.4  16.7  n.a. 
Very important  30.6  20.8  44.4  47.2  n.a. 
Extremely important  56.9  18.1  27.8  31.9  n.a. 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  n.a. 
INDICATOR OF IMPORTANCE* 
Total  0.861  0.576  0.726  0.767  0.733 
High technology industries  0.833  0.750  0.792  0.792  0.792 
Medium-high technology industries  0.861  0.611  0.741  0.769  0.746 
Medium-low technology industries  0.857  0.571  0.741  0.768  0.734 
Low technology industries  0.886  0.409  0.614  0.750  0.665 
*  Calculated in a way that answers »not important « are weighted by 0.0, answers »less important« by 0.25, answers »important« 
by 0.50, answers »very important« by 0.75 and answers »extremely important« by 1.00. The higher the indicator the more 
particular area is important for the competitiveness of sample FIEs. Model and Results of Econometric Analysis 
 
Model 
We have shown that industrial integration through FDI leads to considerable 
increases  in  productivity,  technology  and  quality,  as  well  as  in  sales  and 
exports.  It  also  provides  a  number  of  determinants  that  might  influence 
productivity growth in subsidiaries (level of autonomy, sales structure, foreign 
equity share etc.). This section develops a model for assessing the determinants 
of productivity growth and interpreting results. The main features and operational 
characteristics of foreign subsidiaries explored in the descriptive analysis, are used as 
dependent and independent variables. 
The model is used to assess the determinants of productivity growth
1 in foreign 
manufacturing  subsidiaries in Slovenia. Based on the conceptual  framework 
presented  in  Figure  1,  which  builds  on  the  ‘developmental  subsidiary’ 
perspective, we explore the relevance of control (corporate governance) and 
resource-based variables as determinants of subsidiaries’ productivity growth. 
Corporate governance variables go beyond equity proxy by extending to the 
real control of individual business functions. Competence proxies encompass 
production and technology related variables. 
We define the firm's productivity growth Ait as: 
(1)      ) d , COMP , M , X , CS , F , BF ( G A
j i i i i i it i it =  
where BFit captures variables of control of business functions, and Fi through 
Mit are the other control variables - Fi is a dummy for majority or minority 
                                                 
1 Previous research on FIEs performance in Slovenia and comparative studies (see, for instance, 
Damijan and Rojec 2004, 2003, Damijan et al 3003) proved statistically significant difference 
betwen domestic and foreign owned firms in labour productivity and total factor productivity (TFP) 
in  terms  of  level  as  well  as  in  terms  of  growth.  This  study  considers  higher  average  initial 
productivity  of  FIEs  in  general,  but  focuses  on  explaining  changes  in  productivity  after  the 
entrance of foreign investor in relation with other changes in FIEs (see equation 1). In order to 
measure the effect of changes in busines functions and competitiveness on changes in productivity 
and  examine  the  importance  of  particular  determinants  the  homogeneus  normalised  five-
grademetric  scale  based  on  managerial  perceptions  was  taken  for  all  variables.  Validity  of 
perceptions in productivity changes (i.e. evaluation potential personal evaluation bias) was tested 
by comparing the estimates of changes in productivity based on perceptions with changes in labour 
productivity  after  foreign  investors' entry  calculated from  financial  statements  data.  We found 
positive and significant correlation. As the sample size of FIEs did not allow further breakdown in 
productivity  level  (and  sting  variables  fit  better  in  the  model  than  numerical  variable),  the 
manegerial evaluation of productivity changes was taken as best available measure of productivity 
change.  foreign  ownership,  CSi  is  a  dummy  for  the  firm  size,  and  COMPi  captures 
variables denoting the importance of areas of competitiveness. With Xi and Mi, 
which  refer  respectively  to  export  propensity  (exports  to  foreign  parent 
company or other foreign firms to sales ratio) and import propensity (ratio of 
imports from foreign parent company or other foreign firms to the material 
costs) of the firm, we tested for alternative sources of productivity growth in 
foreign  subsidiaries.  In  addition,  we  allow  for  sector  specific  effects  by 
including  respective  industry  dummy  variable  dj.  Using  all  these  control 
variables  we  try  to  isolate  the  possible  impact  of  the  control  of  business 
functions variables on the productivity growth of the subsidiaries. Probit model 
was used for estimation.  
Spearman correlation coefficients between the variables of control for business 
functions show that all 13 variables are significantly correlated with each other 
and therefore not suitable for use in the model. We therefore created four group 
indicators for subsidiary’s autonomy and used them as variables in the model. 
First, we used an overall indicator for a subsidiary’s autonomy, calculated as 
the unweighted average of the indicators for 13 individual business functions 
(see note 1 to Table 6). Second, we grouped individual business functions in 
three groups, i.e. operational,  marketing and strategic business  functions, as 
proposed  in  Table  2.  These  three  groups  define  operational,  marketing  and 
strategic autonomy of the subsidiaries. They are calculated as the unweighted 
average of the indicators for a subsidiary’s autonomy in individual business 
functions  in  a  particular  group  (see  notes  2,  3  and  4  in  Table  6).  Since 
Spearman correlation coefficients  for the three groups of business  functions 
also show significant correlation (see Table 5), we use them alternatively in the 
regression model. 
The creation of group indicators for subsidiary’s autonomy thus provides us 
with  four  alternative  group  variables,  which  represent  the  key  alternative 
variables in our model. Their main intention here is to find out if there is an 
interdependent relationship between the level of a foreign parent company’s 
control (or alternatively, the level of subsidiary’s autonomy) of the individual 
group variable and the change in subsidiary’s productivity. A dummy variable 
was included in the model to separate majority from minority foreign-owned 
subsidiaries, in order to discover whether majority foreign ownership results in 
higher productivity growth, because it facilitates the transfer of more complex 
technology  and  management  skills  to  local  firms.  Majority  versus  minority 
foreign ownership could also be an alternative proxy variable for foreign parent 
control/subsidiary  autonomy  in  performing  business  functions.    in  that  We 
would expect that foreign parent companies with a majority equity share exhibit 
greater control over the most important business functions of subsidiaries. This Majcen B., Rojec M., Jaklič A., and Radošević S., Productivity Growth and Functional 
Upgrading in Foreign Subsidiaries in the Slovenian Manufacturing Sector 
 
is  confirmed  in  Table  5,  where  overall  autonomy,  marketing  and  strategic 
autonomy show significant correlation with foreign equity share. This is taken 
into account in the model. 
 
 
Table 5: Spearman's correlation coefficients for business functions' group 
variables and for foreign equity share 
 
  Foreign  
equity  
share 
Overall  
autonomy 
Operational 
 functions  
(autonomy) 
Marketing 
functions  
(autonomy
) 
Strategic 
 functions  
(autonomy
) 
Foreign equity 
share 
 
1.0000 
       
Overall 
autonomy 
0.4083*  1.0000       
Operational func-
tions (autonomy) 
 
0.2379 
 
0.8212* 
 
1.0000 
   
Marketing func-
tions (autonomy) 
 
0.3778* 
 
0.9504* 
 
0.6791* 
 
1.0000 
 
Strategic 
functions 
(autonomy) 
 
0.4107* 
 
0.8825* 
 
0.6857* 
 
0.7238* 
 
1.0000 
* indicates significance at 5% level 
 
Using a probit model we tested whether the subsidiary’s productivity growth is 
a function of: 
 
·  overall autonomy: variable f1 
·  operational autonomy: variable f2 
·  marketing autonomy: variable f3 
·  strategic autonomy: variable f4 
·  foreign equity share: dummy q5_skup 
·  company size: dummies dq22 and dq23 
·  share  of  exports/purchases  to/from  foreign  parent  company/other  foreign 
buyers/sellers: variables q10a_sal, q10b_sal, q11_a, q11_b 
·  importance of areas of competitiveness: variables q12a_a – q12a_d 
·  sector dummies: dummies dumh, dumhm and dumlm 
 
Several of the above variables need further explanation. For company size we 
constructed two dummies - for medium and large subsidiaries, small ones being 
the control group. For the equity share variable we constructed a dummy for subsidiaries with majority foreign equity share, with subsidiaries with foreign 
equity share below 50% acting as the control group. For sector dummies we 
grouped subsidiaries according to the technology intensity of the sector they 
belonged to (high, medium high, medium low), subsidiaries in low technology 
intensity sectors acting as the control group. 
Five alternative models (testing alternative areas of autonomy) are used in the 
estimation procedure. The differences between them are that: (1) in the first one 
we use only foreign equity share as a measure of foreign control/subsidiary 
autonomy, (2) in the second one, the variable related to overall autonomy of 
subsidiary, with and without foreign equity share is used, (3) in the third one 
the variable related to operational autonomy, with and without foreign equity 
share is used, (4) in the fourth one, the variable related to marketing autonomy, 
with and  without  foreign equity share is  used, (5) and in the  fifth one, the 
variable related to strategic autonomy, with and without foreign equity share 
was used. In all the models we use the same other control variables. 
Results and discussion 
In this subsection the variables denoting control/autonomy over various groups 
of business functions and other variables are used in order to test for their 
possible relation with the productivity growth of foreign manufacturing 
subsidiaries in Slovenia. Based on equation (1), we estimate the following 
model: 
 
(2)    + + + + + + =
mi m li l ki k i ji j i i M γ X CS χ F δ f α b a  
         
i oi o ni n ε dums θ COMP η + + +  
 
where bt is a constant term (a residual that accounts for alternative sources of 
productivity growth not accounted for in the model), aj represents the impact of 
four  alternative  group  variables  of  subsidiary's  autonomy,  δ  measures  the 
difference in productivity growth rates between subsidiaries with majority and 
minority foreign equity share, ck measures the difference in productivity growth 
rates between different sized subsidiaries, φl represent the impact of sales to 
foreign  parent  company  or  other  foreign  firms,  gm  represents  the  impact  of 
purchases of intermediate inputs from foreign parent company or from other 
foreign sellers, hn represent the impact of different areas of competitiveness, θo 
is parameter of sector dummy, while ε is the error term. 
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The results obtained are presented in Table 6 below. After controlling for other 
possible  determinants  of  productivity  growth,  three  of  four  group  business 
functions’ control/autonomy variables are significantly and positively related to 
productivity growth. This means that the level of control of business functions 
by  foreign  parent  companies  or,  alternatively,  the  level  of  autonomy  of 
subsidiaries in business functions is found to be one of the determinants of 
differences in productivity growth between subsidiaries. The level of foreign 
parent companies' overall control and the level of their control of marketing and 
strategic  functions  in  fact  seem  to  be  the  most  important  determinants  of 
productivity growth in foreign subsidiaries in the Slovenian manufacturing. The 
higher  the  foreign  parent's  overall  control  of  business  functions,  as  well  as 
marketing and especially strategic functions, the higher the productivity growth 
in subsidiaries. Foreign parent companies seem to seek control of strategic and 
marketing business functions and leave operational control to the subsidiaries. 
This is as expected, since control of operational functions has no significant 
impact on productivity  growth. We presume that this control pattern  means 
maintenance  of  basically  production-oriented  mandate  in  subsidiaries  for 
products shipped to parent or other foreign buyers. 
In the basic model, which does not contain any variables for business functions' 
control, foreign equity share proves to have a significant and positive impact on 
subsidiaries' productivity growth, i.e. productivity growth in majority foreign 
owned  subsidiaries  is  significantly  higher  than  in  minority  foreign  owned 
subsidiaries.  However,  when  we  introduce  variables  of  business  functions' 
control  in  the  model,  foreign  equity  share  loses  its  significance  almost 
completely; it is only in the model with operational autonomy, where the level 
of foreign equity share is significantly and positively related to productivity 
growth. The level of foreign equity share as such is, thus, not (or much less 
explanatory) a determinant of productivity  growth, and  foreign equity share 
does not seem to be an alternative for foreign parent companies' control of 
marketing  and  strategic  business  functions.  The  control  of  marketing  and 
strategic business functions is obviously important per se and is probably based 
on factors like technology, marketing and supply channels etc. Foreign parent 
companies are eager to exercise control over marketing and strategic functions, 
regardless  of  whether  they  hold  majority  or  minority  equity  share.  In  other 
words, the level and mechanisms of control of individual business functions 
seem not to be related to the level of foreign equity share. Table 6: Probit estimates 
MODEL 2: 
WITH OVERALL  
AUTONOMY 
MODEL 3: 
WITH OPERATIONAL  
AUTONOMY 
MODEL 4: 
WITH MARKETING  
AUTONOMY 
MODEL 5: 
WITH STRATEGIC  
AUTONOMY 
MODEL 1: 
BASIC  
With foreign equity  
share 
only  With foreign  
equity share 
Without foreign  
equityshare 
With foreign  
equity share 
Without foreign  
equityshare 
With foreign  
equity share 
Without foreign  
equity 
share 
With foreign  
equity share 
Without 
foreign 
equity 
share 
VARIABLE 
Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
Autonomy of subsidiary – overall
1    *1.804472 
(1.895) 
**2.279591 
(2.637) 
           
Operational autonomy
2        1.127359 
(0.801) 
1.74861 
(1.303) 
       
Marketing autonomy 
3            *1.043399 
(1.751) 
**1.351204 
(2.442) 
   
Startegic autonomy
4                **1.969829 
(2.116) 
**2.336313 
(2.858) 
Foreign equity share  **.5428179 
(2.152) 
.3405947 
(1.213) 
  *.4931603 
(1.902) 
  .3884658 
(1.419) 
  .2421125 
(0.829) 
 
Dummy – medium size firm  .1808065 
(0.469) 
.2378056 
(0.561) 
.2939005 
(0.700) 
.2492487 
(0.630) 
.3041201 
(0.779) 
.2007172 
(0.477) 
.2535815 
(0.608) 
.3596732 
(0.894) 
.39887 
(0.999) 
Dummy – large size firm  **1.276277 
(2.926) 
**1.040262 
(2.284) 
**1.181968 
(2.687) 
**1.274438 
(2.933) 
*1.496063 
(3.585) 
**1.011294 
(2.221) 
**1.172757 
(2.665) 
**1.382349 
(3.114) 
**1.492654 
(3.518) 
Exports to foreign  owner  **.4955838 
(2.294) 
**.6237265 
(2.688) 
**.6343125 
(2.755) 
**.5186912 
(2.367) 
**.529233 
(2.449) 
**.6179478 
(2.676) 
**.6276832 
(2.746) 
**.555962 
(2.481) 
**.5653284 
(2.532) 
Exports to other foreign firms  *.5346739 
(1.782) 
*.5869635 
(1.890) 
**5947218 
(1.932) 
*.5351816 
(1.781) 
*.5270566 
(1.787) 
**.5919314 
(1.906) 
**.6035566 
(1.967) 
**.5894915 
(1.912) 
**.5931247 
(1.933) 
Imports of intermediate products from foreign owner  -.0051931 
(-0.878) 
-.0090264 
(-1.341) 
-.009804 
(-1.476) 
-.0065898 
(-1.060) 
-.0077389 
(-1.271) 
-.0081915 
(-1.239) 
-.0088569 
(-1.358) 
-.0077723 
(-1.254) 
-.0083237 
(-1.357) 
Imports of interm. products from other foreign firms  -.0014106 
(-0.180) 
-.0029223 
(-0.346) 
-.0043232 
(-0.519) 
-.0026347 
(-0.329) 
-.0040877 
(-0.520) 
-.0018431 
(-0.221) 
-.0031489 
(-0.383) 
-.0053489 
(-0.651) 
-.0063721 
(-0.786) 
Quality control  .7598863 
(0.795) 
.5766136 
(0.582) 
.336969 
(0.350) 
.9566708 
(0.968) 
.5569246 
(0.583) 
.3829605 
(0.388) 
.0326343 
(0.034) 
.9769035 
(0.999) 
.8115212 
(0.851) 
Patents and licences  -.1013095 
(-0.165) 
-.2669526 
(-0.396) 
-.3572424 
(-0.542) 
-.1316194 
(-0.215) 
-.2520734 
(-0.426) 
-.2555861 
(-0.380) 
-.3621243 
(-0.552) 
-.2160861 
(-0.346) 
-.2825469 
(-0.461) 
People and training  .0971497 
(0.098) 
-.0668056 
(-0.061) 
-.244356 
(-0.227) 
.1281637 
(0.129) 
-.123716 
(-0.127) 
-.0743803 
(-0.068) 
-.2937226 
(-0.273) 
-.0993088 
(-0.099) 
-.2345587 
(-0.237) 
Management  .3004607 
(0.297) 
.4063309 
(0.379) 
.6889491 
(0.668) 
.1285967 
(0.124) 
.5214901 
(0.526) 
.5814359 
(0.543) 
.9682698 
(0.950) 
.2598874 
(0.249) 
.4636204 
(0.461)  
 
MODEL  
WITH OVERALL  
AUTONOMY 
MODEL  
WITH OPERATIONAL  
AUTONOMY 
MODEL  
WITH MARKETING  
AUTONOMY 
MODEL  
WITH STRATEGIC  
AUTONOMY 
BASIC MODEL 
 
With foreign  
equity share  With foreign  
equity share 
 
Without foreign  
Equity share 
With foreign 
 Equity  share 
Without foreign 
 Equity share 
With foreign 
 equity share 
Without foreign 
 Equity share 
With foreign  
equity share 
Without 
foreign  
Equity share 
VARIABLE 
Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
Sector dummy – high technology intensity  *-1.300509 
(-1.822) 
*-1.257646 
(-1.724) 
-1.094299 
(-1.532) 
-1.367809 
(-1.887) 
-1.14681 
(-1.607) 
*-1.306101 
(-1.790) 
-1.127828 
(-1.577) 
-1.056729 
(-1.457) 
-.8960678 
(-1.286) 
Sector dummy – medium high technology 
intensity  
-.4423542 
(-0.905) 
-.347836 
(-0.684) 
-.2223303 
(-0.449) 
-.4740909 
(-0.964) 
-.2973948 
(-0.623) 
-.4009337 
(-0.787) 
-.2722067 
(-0.546) 
-.2056749 
(-0.408) 
-.0764767 
(-0.160) 
Sector dummy – medium low technology 
intensity 
-.0660794 
(-0.122) 
.2469059 
(0.423) 
.4887599 
(0.894) 
-.0296298 
(-0.054) 
.3403559 
(0.669) 
.1432038 
(0.249) 
.3952035 
(0.725) 
.3426714 
(0.589) 
.5624791 
(1.086) 
Pseudo R
2  0.2342  0.2526  0.2405  0.2390  0.2108  0.2482  0.2315  0.2689  0.2637 
Number of obs.  64  59  59  64  64  59  59  64  64 
 
Notes: 
 
(i)  Dependent variable: productivity growth. 
(ii)  Z-statistics in parentheses. 
(iii)  ** and * indicate significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
1/  Autonomy of subsidiary - overall: Average value of subsidiary autonomy in all 13 business functions (see Table 2). 
2/  Operational autonomy: Average value of subsidiary autonomy in 4 operational business functions (see Table 2). 
3/  Marketing autonomy: Average value of subsidiary autonomy in 5 marketing business functions  (see Table 2). 
4/  Strategic autonomy: Average value of subsidiary autonomy in 4 strategic business functions  (see Table 2).  
 
The model also points to two other determinants of subsidiaries’ productivity 
growth. The first is the size of the subsidiary and the second is its (export) sales 
orientation. Subsidiary size dummies show that large subsidiaries (with more 
than 250 employees) have significantly higher average change in productivity 
compared to small and medium sized subsidiaries. This is expected given the 
importance  of  export  orientation  within  basically  production  oriented 
subsidiaries. 
Subsidiaries with a higher proportion of sales to foreign parent companies or to 
other foreign buyers experience higher and statistically significant changes in 
productivity levels. In the case of closer integration of subsidiaries in foreign 
parent companies network (measured by the share of subsidiary sales going to 
foreign  parent  company),  the  latter  seem  to  be  more  eager  to  increase 
subsidiaries productivity levels. As a consequence, more technology and other 
knowledge/skills are transferred to subsidiaries. 
Although the descriptive analysis put forward various areas of competitveness 
as  being  important  for  subsidiaries  perfomance,  most  notably  quality, 
management and human resources, the regression analysis does not confirm 
such  a  conclusion.  None  of  the  four  variables  related  to  areas  of 
competitiveness,  included  in  the  regression,  is  significant  for  productivity 
growth  of  subsidiaries.  This  is  in  line  with  the  high  importance  of  foreign 
parent companies' control of business functions for subsidiaries' productivity 
growth.  Foreign  parent  companies  seem  to  take  care  of  subsidiaries' 
competitiveness.  The  result  may  also  reflect  the  need  that  single  area  of 
competitivness is not enough to influence productivity growth, but only a set of 
competitive areas.    
In  two  variants  of  the  regression  (models  with  overall  and  with  marketing 
autonomy) subsidiaries in high technology sectors exhibit significantly lower, 
in fact negative changes in productivity than subsidiaries in low tech sectors
1. 
One reason for this is that the scope for productivity growth in low technology 
sectors  has  been  much  higher  than  in  high  technology  sectors.  Also,  what 
constitute FDI in high tech sectors in Slovenia is mostly low value added value 
segments  of  these  sectors.  Achieving  production  capability  in  these  sectors 
obviously does not suffice for increases in productivity. 
 
 
                                                 
1 This is also confirmed by some other analyses, which use different databases (financial statements 
of the total population of FIEs) (see Damijan and Rojec 2004) and which claim that productivity 
growth is higher in FIEs in low and medium-low technology industries.  
 
Conclusions 
The intention of the paper is to assess the determinants of productivity growth 
in manufacturing foreign subsidiaries in Slovenia. Special attention is given to 
the  impact  of  control  patterns  on  subsidiaries’  productivity  growth. 
Additionally we check for the impact of foreign equity share, company size, 
areas of competitiveness, exports/imports to/from foreign parent company on 
the productivity growth. The database is a questionnaire survey of 72 foreign 
subsidiaries in the Slovenian manufacturing sector. 
Empirical  analysis  shows  that  industrial  integration  through  FDI  led  to 
considerable increases in productivity, technology and quality, as  well as in 
sales  and  exports.  The  models  suggest  the  following  conclusions  about  the 
productivity growth and control in foreign subsidiaries: 
 
·  The level of foreign parent companies' overall control and the level of their 
control of marketing and strategic functions seem to be the most important 
determinants of productivity growth in foreign subsidiaries in the Slovenian 
manufacturing. The higher the foreign parent's control overall, as well as of 
marketing and especially of strategic functions, the higher the productivity 
growth in subsidiaries. Foreign parent companies seem to seek control of 
strategic and marketing business functions and leave operational control to 
subsidiaries themselves.  
·  The above pattern of control and productivity growth holds regardless of the 
inclusion of foreign equity share dummy in the model or not. The level of 
the foreign equity share as such is not a determinant of productivity growth, 
and  foreign  equity  share  does  not  seem  to  be  an  alternative  for  foreign 
parent  companies'  control  of  marketing  and  strategic  business  functions. 
The  control  of  marketing  and  strategic  business  functions  is  obviously 
important  per  se  and  is  probably  based  on  factors  like  technology, 
marketing and supply channels etc. Foreign parent companies are eager to 
exercise  control  over  marketing  and  strategic  functions,  regardless  of 
whether they hold majority or minority equity share. In other words, the 
level and mechanisms of control of individual business functions seem not 
to be related to the level of foreign equity share. 
 
The  model  points  to  some  other  determinants  of  subsidiaries’  productivity 
growth. The first is subsidiary size; large subsidiaries have significantly higher 
average  change  in  productivity  compared  to  small  and  medium  sized 
subsidiaries. The second is the proportion of sales to foreign parent company; 
subsidiaries with higher proportion of sales to foreign parent companies or to  
 
other foreign buyers experience higher changes in productivity level. The third 
is that, in two variants of the model, subsidiaries in high technology intensity 
sectors exhibit significantly lower changes in productivity than subsidiaries in 
other sectors.  
All in all, the more subsidiaries are integrated into foreign parent companies’ –
in terms of marketing and strategic management, and export flows wise - the 
higher productivity growth they experience. Keeping marketing and strategic 
control  in  the  hands  of  foreign  parent  companies  seems  to  be  the  main 
determinant of subsidiaries productivity growth. Foreign parent companies are 
eager to keep marketing and strategic control regardless of the equity share they 
have. 
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